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We explore the dynamic e¤ects of minimum wage in a Schumpeterian model with
endogenous market structure and obtain the following results. First, raising the mini-
mum wage decreases the employment of low-skill workers and increases the unemploy-
ment rate. Second, it decreases the level of output. Third, it decreases the transitional
growth rate of output but does not a¤ect the steady-state growth rate. Our quanti-
tative analysis shows that the magnitude of the negative e¤ects of minimum wage is
sharply increasing in low-skill labor intensity in production and that employed low-skill
workers gain initially but might su¤er from slower growth in future wages.
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1 Introduction
In the US, some states have recently passed legislation to raise the minimum wage signi-
cantly. For example, California and Massachusetts will raise the minimum wage to $15 per
hour by 2023, whereas Illinois will do so by 2025.1 This study explores the e¤ects of min-
imum wage on unemployment and economic growth. We incorporate minimum wage into
a Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure and obtain the following results.
First, raising the minimum wage decreases the employment of low-skill workers and increases
the unemployment rate. Second, it decreases the level of output. Third, it decreases the
transitional growth rate of output but does not a¤ect the steady-state growth rate.2 The
negative e¤ect of minimum wage on the level of output is in line with standard theory,
whereas endogenizing both the equilibrium growth rate and the market structure gives rise
to a transitional growth deceleration and amplies the traditional level e¤ect of minimum
wage.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. A binding minimum wage
decreases the demand for low-skill workers and causes their employment level to fall below
full employment, which leads to unemployment. Lower employment reduces the level of
output. The smaller market size in turn reduces the incentives for innovation and leads to a
decrease in the transitional growth rate of output. Over time, the smaller market size causes
some rms to exit the market, and the market size of each rm gradually returns to the
initial level. Given that it is the average rm size (rather than the aggregate market size)
that determines the incentives for innovation,3 the steady-state growth rate of output also
returns to the initial level. Therefore, raising the minimum wage has a temporary stiing
e¤ect on growth, but not a permanent one.
Calibrating our model to US data for a quantitative analysis, we nd that raising the
minimum wage by 1% increases the unemployment rate by at least 0.3% and decreases the
growth rate of output by at least 0.1% on impact. Furthermore, the magnitude of these
e¤ects is sharply increasing in the intensity of low-skill labor in production. Therefore,
a more skill-intensive economy is more immune to the negative e¤ects of minimum wage.
Finally, we simulate the path of low-skill wages and nd that employed low-skill workers
gain initially but might su¤er from slower growth in future wages.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. The semi-
nal R&D-based growth model developed by Romer (1990) focuses on the invention of new
products (i.e., horizontal innovation). The Schumpeterian model developed by Aghion and
Howitt (1992) focuses on the quality improvement of products (i.e., vertical innovation).
Subsequent studies, such as Smulders and van de Klundert (1995), Peretto (1998, 1999) and
Howitt (1999), combine the two dimensions of innovation and develop the second-generation
Schumpeterian model.4 This study contributes to the literature by incorporating minimum
wage into this vintage of the Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure to
1The current federal minimum wage in the US is $7.25 per hour.
2Although empirical studies on minimum wage tend to nd contrasting e¤ects, these results are consistent
with recent studies by Sabia (2014, 2015), who nds that minimum wage reduces low-skill employment and
causes a short-run decline in state GDP generated by low-skill industries.
3See Laincz and Peretto (2006) for empirical evidence.
4See Ha and Howitt (2007) and Madsen (2010) for evidence that supports the second-generation model.
2
explore its e¤ects on unemployment and innovation.5
This study also relates to the vast literature on labor markets and economic growth; see
Topel (1999) for a comprehensive survey. Our study relates most closely to studies that
explore minimum wage in growth models. Early studies by Cahuc and Michel (1996), Ravn
and Sorensen (1999) and Askenazy (2003) identify interesting mechanisms through which
minimum wage has ambiguous e¤ects on growth; see also Tamai (2009) and Fanti and Gori
(2011) for more recent studies and a discussion of the subsequent literature. A recent study
by Agenor and Lim (2018) develops an ambitious quantitative framework based on the Romer
model with horizontal innovation to explore the dynamic e¤ects of minimum wage and also
nds that it increases unemployment and reduces growth. This study complements these
previous studies by considering a Schumpeterian model with two dimensions of innovation
to analytically derive and quantify the complete transitional e¤ects of minimum wage on
growth and showing that endogenous market structure changes its e¤ects at di¤erent time
horizons.
2 A Schumpeterian model with minimum wage
The Schumpeterian model with in-house R&D and endogenous market structure is based on
Peretto (2007, 2011a). We incorporate minimum wage into the Peretto model to explore its
e¤ects on unemployment and innovation.
2.1 Household
The representative household has the following utility function:
U =
1Z
0
e t ln ctdt, (1)
where ct is the households consumption of nal good (numeraire) and  > 0 determines the
rate of subjective discounting. The household maximizes (1) subject to
_at = rtat + !tH + wtlt + bt(L  lt)  ct    t. (2)
at is the value of assets owned by the household. rt is the real interest rate. The household
has H + L members.6 Each of the H members supplies one unit of high-skill labor and
earns !t, which is above the minimum wage and determined as an equilibrium outcome in
the high-skill labor market. Each of the L members supplies one unit of low-skill labor.
Employed low-skill workers lt earn wt, which is determined by the minimum wage set by the
government. Unemployed low-skill workers L  lt receive an unemployment benet bt < wt.
5For other approaches of incorporating unemployment into the innovation-driven growth model, see
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) for search frictions, Parello (2010) for e¢ciency wage, Peretto (2011b)
for wage bargaining, and Ji et al. (2016) and Chu et al. (2016, 2018) for trade unions.
6Our results are robust to allowing for population growth. Derivations are available upon request.
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The household pays a lump-sum tax  t to the government. From dynamic optimization, the
Euler equation is
_ct
ct
= rt   . (3)
2.2 Final good
Competitive rms produce nal good Yt using the following production function:
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)[Z

t (i)Z
1 
t l

t h
1 
t =Nt]
1 di, (4)
where f; ; g 2 (0; 1). Xt(i) is the quantity of intermediate good i 2 [0; Nt], where Nt is
the mass of available intermediate goods at time t. The productivity of Xt(i) depends on
its own quality Zt(i) and also on the average quality Zt 
1
Nt
R Nt
0
Zt(i)di of all intermediate
goods capturing technology spillovers. The degree of technology spillovers is 1 . We follow
Romer (1990) to assume that the production of nal good uses both high-skill labor ht and
low-skill labor lt with a unitary elasticity of substitution. The term l

t h
1 
t =Nt captures a
congestion e¤ect of variety and removes the scale e¤ect in the model.7
Prot maximization yields the following conditional demand functions for flt; ht; Xt(i)g:
lt = (1  )Yt=wt, (5)
ht = (1  )(1  )Yt=!t, (6)
Xt(i) =


pt(i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t l

t h
1 
t =Nt, (7)
where pt(i) is the price of Xt(i). Competitive rms pay Yt =
R Nt
0
pt(i)Xt(i)di for intermedi-
ate goods. The market-clearing condition for high-skill labor implies ht = H. The minimum
wage in the low-skill labor market implies unemployment (i.e., lt < L).
2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
The monopolistic rm in industry i 2 [0; Nt] uses Xt(i) units of nal good to produce Xt(i)
units of intermediate good i and incurs Zt (i)Z
1 
t units of nal good as a xed operating
cost. The rm also invests Rt(i) units of nal good to improve the quality Zt(i) of its product.
The in-house R&D process is
_Zt(i) = Rt(i). (8)
In industry i, the prot ow (before R&D investment) at time t is
t(i) = [pt(i)  1]Xt(i)  Z

t (i)Z
1 
t . (9)
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt(i) =
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z s
t
rudu

[s(i) Rs(i)] ds. (10)
7Our results are robust to parameterizing this congestion e¤ect as lt h
1 
t =N
1 
t , where  2 (0; 1). See
the discussion in footnote 10.
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The rm maximizes (10) subject to (7)-(9). The current-value Hamiltonian is
Ht(i) = t(i) Rt(i) + t(i) _Zt(i), (11)
where t(i) is the co-state variable on (8). We solve this optimization problem in Appendix
A and derive the prot-maximizing price pt(i) = 1= > 1.
We follow previous studies to consider a symmetric equilibrium in which Zt(i) = Zt and
Xt(i) = Xt for i 2 [0; Nt].
8 From (7) and pt(i) = 1=, the quality-adjusted rm size is
Xt
Zt
= 2=(1 )
H1 
Nt
lt . (12)
We dene the following transformed variable:
xt  
2=(1 )H
1 
Nt
, (13)
which is a state variable. Lemma 1 derives the rate of return on quality-improving R&D,
which is increasing in the rm size xtl

t .
Lemma 1 The rate of return to in-house R&D is
rqt = 
t
Zt
= 

1  

xtl

t   

. (14)
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.4 Entrants
We follow previous studies to assume that entrants have access to aggregate technology Zt
to ensure symmetric equilibrium at any time t. A new rm incurs Xt units of nal good
to set up its operation and enter the market with a new intermediate good.  > 0 is a
cost parameter, and the entry cost Xt is increasing in the size of initial production. The
asset-pricing equation determines the rate of return on assets as
rt =
t  Rt
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (15)
The entry condition is
Vt = Xt. (16)
Substituting (8), (9), (13), (16) and pt(i) = 1= into (15) yields the return on entry as
9
ret =
1


1  

 
+ zt
xtl

t

+ 
_lt
lt
+
_xt
xt
+ zt, (17)
where zt  _Zt=Zt is the growth rate of aggregate quality.
8Symmetry also implies t(i) = t, Rt(i) = Rt and Vt(i) = Vt.
9We treat entry and exit symmetrically (i.e., the scrap value of exiting an industry is also Xt); therefore,
Vt = Xt always holds, which implies r
e
t = rt for all t. Alternatively, one can consider a random exit shock
to generate exit dynamics.
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2.5 Government
The government sets a minimum wage wt that is binding in the low-skill labor market. We
follow previous studies to assume that wt is proportionally higher than the equilibrium wage
wt that would have prevailed without the minimum wage; i.e.,
wt = (1 + )w

t , (18)
where  > 0 is the minimum-wage policy instrument. The government levies a lump-sum
tax  t on the household to balance the scal budget  t = bt(L  lt).
2.6 Equilibrium
We dene the equilibrium in Appendix B.
2.7 Aggregation
The resource constraint on nal good is
Yt = ct +Nt(Xt + Zt +Rt) + _NtXt. (19)
Substituting (7) and pt(i) = 1= into (4) and imposing symmetry yield the level of output:
Yt = 
2=(1 )Ztl

tH
1 . (20)
Substituting (5) and (20) into (18) yields
(1  )2=(1 )Zt

H
lt
1 
= (1 + )(1  )2=(1 )Zt

H
L
1 
, (21)
which implies
lt =
L
(1 + )1=(1 )
< L. (22)
Equation (22) shows that low-skill employment is stationary (i.e., lt = l for all t). Therefore,
the growth rate of output is simply determined by the quality growth rate; i.e., _Yt=Yt = zt.
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2.8 Dynamics
To analyze the dynamics of the economy, we derive the consumption-output ratio rst.
Lemma 2 The consumption-output ratio jumps to a unique and stable steady-state value:
ct
Yt
= 2 + 1  . (23)
Proof. See Appendix A.
10Parameterizing the congestion e¤ect in (4) as lt h
1 
t =N
1 
t would yield Yt = 
2=(1 )ZtN

t l
H1 
in which case the growth rate of output is given by _Yt=Yt = zt +  _Nt=Nt, where  _Nt=Nt would capture
an additional negative e¤ect of minimum wage on productivity. The overall output growth rate _Yt=Yt is
nonetheless determined by the rate of return rqt on in-house R&D in (14) as (24) shows.
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Lemma 2 implies that consumption and output grow at the same rate given by
gt 
_Yt
Yt
=
_ct
ct
= rt   , (24)
where the last equality uses (3). Substituting (14) and (22) into (24) yields
gt = zt = 

1  

Lxt
(1 + )=(1 )
  

  , (25)
which is positive if and only if
xt > x 

1  
 

+ 
 (1 + )=(1 )
L
. (26)
Intuitively, each rms market size needs to be large enough for in-house R&D to be prof-
itable. For the rest of the analysis, we assume that xt > x, which implies zt > 0 and r
q
t = rt
for all t. Lemma 3 derives the dynamics of xt, which in turn determines the number of rms
(i.e., Nt = 
2=(1 )H1 =xt) in the market.
Lemma 3 The dynamics of xt is determined by an one-dimensional di¤erential equation:
_xt =
(1  )  
L
(1 + )=(1 )  

(1  ) (1  )

  

xt. (27)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 Under the parameter restriction  < min f(1  ); (1  ) (1  ) =()g,
the dynamics of xt is globally stable and xt gradually converges to a unique steady-state value.
The steady-state values fx; gg are given by
x(
+
) =
(1  )  
(1  ) (1  ) =   
(1 + )=(1 )
L
> x, (28)
g = 

1  

(1  )  
(1  ) (1  ) =   
  

   > 0. (29)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows that given an initial x0, the state variable xt gradually converges
to its steady-state x. Equation (25) shows that when xt converges to x
, the equilibrium
growth rate gt also converges to its steady-state g
.
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3 Dynamic e¤ects of minimum wage
Equation (22) shows that raising the minimum wage  decreases low-skill employment lt and
increases the unemployment rate ut given by
ut 
L  lt
H + L
=
L
H + L

1 
1
(1 + )1=(1 )

(30)
for all t. Substituting (22) into (20) yields the equilibrium level of output Yt, which is
decreasing in  for a given technology level Zt. In other words, raising the minimum wage
leads to a contemporaneous drop in output by decreasing employment. Equation (25) shows
that the equilibrium growth rate gt is also decreasing in  for a given xt. Intuitively, raising
the minimum wage decreases employment lt and the rm size xtl

t , which in turn decreases
the rate of return to in-house R&D in (14) and the equilibrium growth rate in (25). However,
the lower level of employment reduces the aggregate market size and leads to an exit of rms,
which in turn gives rise to a gradual increase in xt as implied by (27). When xt reaches the
new steady-state x, which is increasing in  as shown in (28), the steady-state growth rate
returns to the initial level because g in (29) is independent of . Therefore, raising the
minimum wage has a temporary stiing e¤ect on growth, but not a permanent one. Figure
1 illustrates the transitional path of gt when the government raises  at time t. Proposition
2 summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 Raising the minimum wage has the following e¤ects: (a) it permanently de-
creases the employment of low-skill workers, (b) it permanently increases the unemployment
rate; (c) it decreases the level of output for a given Zt; (d) it decreases the transitional growth
rate of output but does not a¤ect the steady-state growth rate.
Proof. Proven in text.
Figure 1: Transition dynamics of the growth rate
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3.1 Quantitative analysis
We calibrate the model to simulate the e¤ects of raising  by 1%. The model features the
following parameters: f; ; ; ; ; ; ; L=Hg. We set the discount rate  to 0.04. We follow
Iacopetta et al. (2019) to set the degree of technology spillovers 1    to 0.833. From the
estimates in Heathcote et al. (2010), we consider  2 [0:25; 0:75] as a plausible range for the
intensity of low-skill labor. Then, we calibrate f; ; ; ; L=Hg by matching the following
moments in the US. First, labor income share is 60%. Second, the consumption share of
output is 64%. Third, the growth rate gt is 2%. Fourth, the unemployment rate ut is 6%.
Fifth, the skill premium !t=wt is 1.40.
Table 1 presents the calibrated parameter values and the simulated e¤ects on ut. Figure
2 presents the simulated paths of gt. We nd that raising the minimum wage  by 0.01
increases the unemployment rate ut permanently by at least 0.34% (i.e., from 6% to 6.34%)
and decreases the growth rate gt on impact by at least 0.10% (i.e., from 2% to 1.90%). The
magnitude of these e¤ects is sharply increasing in  because minimum wage a¤ects low-skill
labor. Therefore, a more skill-intensive economy (i.e., a smaller ) is more immune to the
negative e¤ects of minimum wage.
Table 1: Calibration and simulation
      L=H  ut
0.250 0.040 0.167 0.400 6.250 1.676 0.560 0.147 0.34%
0.500 0.040 0.167 0.400 6.250 1.676 1.553 0.053 1.03%
0.750 0.040 0.167 0.400 6.250 1.676 4.532 0.019 2.91%
Figure 2: Simulated paths of the growth rate
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3.2 Dynamic e¤ects on low-skill wages
Finally, we explore the dynamic e¤ects of  on the path of minimum wages:
lnwt = ln[(1  )] + ln(Yt=lt), (31)
where ln(Yt=lt) is
ln(Yt=lt) = ln(Y0=l0) +
Z t
0
gsds = ln
h
2=(1 )Z0 (H=L)
1 
i
+ ln(1 + )| {z }
" in 
+
Z t
0
gsds| {z }
# in 
, (32)
which uses (20) and (22). Figure 3 presents the simulated paths of  lnwt given by
 lnwt  |{z}
"+" level e¤ect
+
Z t
0
gsds| {z }
" " growth e¤ect
(33)
when  increases by 1%. It shows that although employed low-skill workers receive higher
wages initially, even these intended beneciaries might experience a loss in future wages due
to the temporary slow down in growth.
Figure 3: Simulated paths of changes in low-skill wages
4 Conclusion
This study analyzes minimumwage in the Peretto model of Schumpeterian growth. Although
our nding that minimum wage reduces employment and growth is not surprising, it is
consistent with recent empirical evidence; see e.g., Sabia (2014, 2015). Finally, this study
10
focuses on quality-improving innovation, which determines long-run growth,11 and leaves the
important implications on automation (i.e., labor-saving technologies) to future research.12
References
[1] Agenor, P.-R., and Lim, K., 2018. Unemployment, growth and welfare e¤ects of labor
market reforms. Journal of Macroeconomics, 58, 19-38.
[2] Aghion, P., and Howitt, P., 1992. A model of growth through creative destruction.
Econometrica, 60, 323-351.
[3] Askenazy, P., 2003. Minimum wage, exports and growth. European Economic Review,
47, 147-164.
[4] Cahuc, P., and Michel, P., 1996. Minimum wage unemployment and growth. European
Economic Review, 40, 1463-1482.
[5] Chu, A., Cozzi, G., and Furukawa, Y., 2016. Unions, innovation and cross-country wage
inequality. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 64, 104-118.
[6] Chu, A., Kou, Z., and Liu, X., 2018. Labor union and the wealth-income ratio. Eco-
nomics Letters, 167, 29-35.
[7] Fanti, L, and Gori, L., 2011. On economic growth and minimum wages. Journal of
Economics, 103, 59-82.
[8] Ha, J., and Howitt, P., 2007. Accounting for trends in productivity and R&D: A Schum-
peterian critique of semi-endogenous growth theory. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 33, 733-74.
[9] Heathcote, J., Storesletten, K., and Violante, G., 2010. The macroeconomic implications
of rising wage inequality in the United States. Journal of Political Economy, 118, 681-
722.
[10] Howitt, P., 1999. Steady endogenous growth with population and R&D inputs growing.
Journal of Political Economy, 107, 715-730.
[11] Iacopetta, M., Minetti, R., and Peretto, P., 2019. Financial markets, industry dynamics
and growth. Economic Journal, 129, 2192-2215.
[12] Ji, L., Chang, J., and Huang, C., 2016. Unionization, market structure, and economic
growth. Southern Economic Journal, 82, 935-951.
[13] Laincz, C., and Peretto, P., 2006. Scale e¤ects in endogenous growth theory: An error
of aggregation not specication. Journal of Economic Growth, 11, 263-288.
11See Peretto and Connolly (2007) on why long-run growth must be driven by vertical innovation.
12Lordan and Neumark (2018) provide evidence that minimum wage decreases low-skill employment and
increases automation.
11
[14] Lordan, G., and Neumark, D., 2018. People versus machines: The impact of minimum
wages on automatable jobs. Labour Economics, 52, 40-53.
[15] Madsen, J., 2008. Semi-endogenous versus Schumpeterian growth models: Testing the
knowledge production function using international data. Journal of Economic Growth,
13, 1-26.
[16] Mortensen, D., and Pissarides, C., 1998. Technological progress, job creation, and job
destruction. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1, 733753.
[17] Parello, C., 2010. A Schumpeterian growth model with equilibrium unemployment.
Metroeconomica, 61, 398-426.
[18] Peretto, P., 1998. Technological change and population growth. Journal of Economic
Growth, 3, 283-311.
[19] Peretto, P., 1999. Cost reduction, entry, and the interdependence of market structure
and economic growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 43, 173-195.
[20] Peretto, P., 2007. Corporate taxes, growth and welfare in a Schumpeterian economy.
Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 353-382.
[21] Peretto, P., 2011a. The growth and welfare e¤ects of decit-nanced dividend tax cuts.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43, 835-869.
[22] Peretto, P., 2011b. Market power, growth, and unemployment. Frontiers of Economics
and Globalization, 11, 493-525.
[23] Peretto, P., and Connolly, M., 2007. The Manhattan metaphor. Journal of Economic
Growth, 12, 329-50.
[24] Ravn, M., and Sorensen, J., 1999. Schooling, training, growth and minimum wages.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101, 441-457.
[25] Romer, P., 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98,
S71-S102.
[26] Sabia, J., 2014. The e¤ects of minimum wages over the business cycle. Journal of Labor
Research, 35, 227-245.
[27] Sabia, J., 2015. Minimum wages and gross domestic product. Contemporary Economic
Policy, 33, 587-605.
[28] Smulders, S. and van de Klundert T., 1995. Imperfect competition, concentration and
growth with rm-specic R&D. European Economic Review, 39, 139-160.
[29] Tamai, T., 2009. Inequality, unemployment, and endogenous growth in a political econ-
omy with a minimum wage. Journal of Economics, 97, 217-232.
[30] Topel, R., 1999. Labor markets and economic growth. Handbook of Labor Economics,
3, 2943-2984.
12
Appendix A (online appendix)
Proof of Lemma 1. The current-value Hamiltonian for monopolistic rm i is given by
(11). Substituting (7)-(9) into (11), we can derive
@Ht (i)
@pt (i)
= 0)
@t (i)
@pt (i)
= 0, (A1)
@Ht (i)
@Rt (i)
= 0) t (i) = 1, (A2)
@Ht (i)
@Zt (i)
= 
(
[pt (i)  1]


pt (i)
1=(1 )
lt h
1 
t
Nt
  
)
Z 1t (i)Z
1 
t = rtt (i)  _t (i) . (A3)
(A1) yields pt (i) = 1=. Substituting (A2), (13) and pt (i) = 1= into (A3) and imposing
symmetry yield (14).
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting (16) into the total asset value at = NtVt yields
at = NtXt = 
2Yt, (A4)
where the second equality uses Yt = NtXt=.
13 Di¤erentiating (A4) with respect to t yields
_Yt
Yt
=
_at
at
= rt +
!tH + wtlt
at
 
ct
at
, (A5)
where the second equality uses (2) and  t = bt(L  lt). Using (3) for rt, (5) for wt, (6) for !t
and (A4) for at, we can rearrange (A5) to obtain
_ct
ct
 
_at
at
=
ct
at
 

+
1  
2

, (A6)
which is increasing in ct=at with a strictly negative y-intercept. Therefore, ct=at must jump
to the steady state. Then, we have (23), noting (A4).
Proof of Lemma 3. Substituting zt = gt = rt    = r
e
t    into (17) yields
_xt
xt
=  
1


1  

 
+ zt
xtl

t

, (A7)
which also uses _lt = 0 from (22). Then, we use the expression of zt in (25) to derive (27).
Proof of Proposition 1. One can rewrite (27) simply as _xt = d1   d2xt. This linear
system for xt has a unique (non-zero) steady state that is globally (and locally) stable if
d1 
(1  )  
L
(1 + )=(1 ) > 0, (A8a)
d2 
(1  ) (1  )

   > 0, (A8b)
from which we obtain  < min f(1  ); (1  ) (1  ) =()g. Then, _xt = 0 yields the
steady-state value x = d1=d2; which gives (28). Substituting (28) into (25) yields (29).
13We derive this by using pt(i) = 1= and Xt(i) = Xt for Yt =
R Nt
0
pt(i)Xt(i)di.
13
Appendix B (online appendix)
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fat; ct; Yt; lt; ht; Xt(i); Rt(i)g and a time path
of prices frt; !t; wt; pt(i); Vt (i)g such that the following conditions are satised:
 the household maximizes utility taking frt; !t; wtg as given;
 competitive rms produce Yt and maximize prots taking fpt(i); !t; wtg as given;
 a monopolistic rm produces Xt(i) and chooses fpt(i); Rt(i)g to maximize Vt(i) taking
rt as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking Vt as given;
 the government balances the scal budget;
 the value of monopolistic rms is equal to the value of the households assets such that
NtVt = at;
 the nal-good market clears such that Yt = ct +Nt(Xt + Zt +Rt) + _NtXt;
 the high-skill labor market clears such that ht = H; and
 the demand for low-skill labor is less than its supply such that lt < L.
14
